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Abstract
Does "empowerment"  come  hand-in-hand  with  higher  rather than through higher  household income.  There are
economic welfare?  In theory,  higher  income is likely  to  diminishing returns  to income, though  income inequality
raise both power  and welfare,  but heterogeneity  in other  emerges as only a  minor factor reducing either aggregate
characteristics  and household  formation can either  power or welfare.  At given income,  the identified
strengthen  or weaken the relationship.  Survey data on  covariates  have strikingly  similar effects on power and
Russian adults  indicate that higher  individual and  welfare. There are some notable differences  between
household  incomes raise  both self-rated  power and  men and women in perceived  power.
welfare. The individual  income effect is primarily direct,
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"Empowerment" might be viewed as solely a matter of the freedoms permitted to all by
the laws and institutions that prevail in a given society.  However,  it is evident that different
people have different abilities to directly influence  the actions of others and that this is so within
a given society, with one set of laws and institutions.  In short, there is inequality of personal
power, just as there is inequality of economic welfare.
Some policy-oriented discussions have taken this observation further to argue that
redressing power inequality - by taking actions that selectively empower those with little power
- should be seen as a distinct policy objective, side-by-side with the more traditional  aims of
reducing poverty and inequality in terms of economic welfare. For example, the World Bank's
(2000) report Attacking Poverty puts the need for "empowerment" on the same level as
promoting (economic) "opportunity"  and "security."
Assessing the empowerment role for public policy calls for a deeper understanding of
how power is assigned to people.  Does lack of power in a given society come hand-in-hand with
income poverty, or is it determined  differently?  Is there a trade-off,  such that some of the things
that enhance economic welfare are not also good for individual empowerment?  Does focusing on
empowerment diminish the income focus of mainstream development  efforts?  What extra
implications does empowerment  hold for income-redistribution policy?  Does the fact that
discussions of empowerment are often linked to gender inequalities reflect differences in the
perceptions of men versus women about power?
This paper explores one possible source of clues on the answers to these questions,
namely by looking at the expressed perceptions of people about their own power - to see how
2those perceptions compare with both subjective and objective indicators of their welfare.  We
examine how much agreement there is between subjective "power" and "welfare" in data for
Russia, and examine whether there is any sign that different covariates matter.  Although there
has been debate on how much aggregate economic growth raises aggregate  subjective welfare
(the total number of people who feel satisfied with their lives,  for example), a positive effect is
still to be expected at the individual level and there is ample supportive evidence for that effect.2
But we know less about income effects on perceived power, and the role of non-income factors,
such as gender, age, ethnicity and location.
Relying on expressed perceptions brings some concerns.  Possibly a person's feeling of
power is a fiction in reality, and similarly for perceived welfare.  However,  while there is
undoubtedly noise in subjective data, it can still identify real effects that are illusive otherwise.3
And without the perception of power to influence things that matter, how can it be said that there
is real "empowerment"?  The perception of power is surely necessary,  though not sufficient.
There are antecedents to our use of subjective data, spread over a number of disciplines.
Economists have traditionally resisted the use of subjective questions, though there are
exceptions. The links between subjective welfare and income have attracted the attention of
economists, including Easterlin (1995) and Oswald (1997).  Subjective  questions have also been
used in calibrating utility functions  of income,  following Van Praag (1968).  In psychology, there
is now a large literature on subjective welfare and its covariates (for a survey see Deiner et al.,
1999).  Various types of subjective  data on power have been used in the social sciences.  In
political science, subjective data have been used to study "power consciousness"  (Aberbach,
2  For further discussion see Easterlin (1995),  Oswald (1997)  and Deiner et al. (1999).
31977) and in research on political efficacy (for example,  Stewart et al, 1992) and political
freedom (Gibson,  1993).  In sociology and social psychology, subjective questions on
powerlessness  have been used to study alienation (Roberts,  1987)  and paranoia (Mirowsky and
Ross, 1983).  There has also been research on related aspects of self-perception such as work in
sociology on subjective class-identification  (Davis and Robinson,  1988).
However, the relationship between power and welfare has received little attention in the
literature.  In one of the few exceptions, Ross and Mirowsky (1992) find evidence  for the U.S.
that wage employment, higher earnings  and higher education are all associated positively with a
greater (subjectively assessed) "sense of control" over one's life - suggestive of greater
empowerment.  Using subjective welfare data for Switzerland,  Frey and Stutzer (2000) find that
the ability of people to influence outcomes of the local political process raises their subjective
welfare. We know of no attempts to examine the joint socio-economic  determinants of  power
and welfare, including the role played by incomes, both in levels and their distribution.
Contemporary Russia is of interest as a setting for this enquiry for two reasons. Firstly,
there is clearly inequality in both power and economic welfare.  Despite the fact that Russians
have enjoyed new-found political freedoms since the late 1980s, it is unlikely that empowerment
has clearly not yet been widely diffused; this variance in perceived power offers the hope of
better understanding its etiology.  The high degree of income inequality that emerged in Russia
in the  1990s also suggests that it is an interesting setting for examining income effects.
Secondly, there are survey data for Russia that offer an opportunity for examining these
issues.  The survey we will use asked all adult respondents to place themselves on Cantil (1965)
3  On the potential of subjective  data for addressing the longstanding problem of identifying welfare
from observed behavior see van Praag (1968), Kapteyn (1994) and Pradhan and Ravallion (2000).
4ladders for both power and welfare.  For assessing perceived power, the survey asked:
"Please  imagine a nine-step ladder, where on the bottom, the first step, stand  people who
are completely without rights, and  on the highest step, the ninth, stand those who have a
lot ofpower. On which step are you?"
We refer to this the Power Ladder Question (PLQ).  The corresponding welfare question is:
"Please  imagine a nine-step ladder  where on the bottom, thefirst  step, stand the poorest
people, and on the highest step, the ninth, stand the rich. On which step are  you today?"
We call this the Welfare Ladder Question (WLQ).  Both questions leave it up to the individual
to decide what it means to be "without rights", to have "a lot of power," or to be "poor" versus
"rich."  In past analysis of the WLQ (in earlier rounds of the same survey), Ravallion and
Lokshin (2002) found that the answers could not be interpreted as solely reflecting real
household income (household income deflated for differences in the cost-of-living and in
household size and composition).  There was evidence of significant individual income (and
other) effects at given household characteristics, and strong effects of education, employment,
health status, area of residence  and other characteristics,  independently of income.  The WLQ is
clearly capturing a broader concept of welfare.
In addition to asking individual perceptions of power and welfare, the surveys collected
a standard set of objective  socio-economic characteristics  that are potential covariates of both
power and welfare.  This allows us to deal with an obvious limitation of past work on subjective
power, namely that these data are only collected  within a relatively light survey instrument.5 A
further advantage of our data is that they are longitudinal, so we can look at how perceptions of
4  See Ravallion and Lokshin (2002) for further discussion of this question and alternatives in the
literature as means of identifying individual welfare functions.
5  For example, Gibson (1999)  compares perceptions of political freedom in the Soviet Union in
1990 across identified covariates and argues that "perceptions of (political) repression have evenly
5power and welfare change over time. By choosing the time period 1998-2000 we also expect to
observe significant welfare gains, since the 1998 survey was done soon after the 1998 financial
crisis, which impacted on household welfare (Lokshin and Ravallion, 2000).
Armed with these data, we address the following questions:
*  How much do perceptions of current power and welfare agree?  How much of this is
accountable  to observable covariates?
*  How much does income inequality attenuate aggregate power and welfare?  How
important is inequality within the household versus between households?
*  How do the answers to these questions differ between men and women?
The following section offers some theoretical  arguments with bearing on how closely one
might expect power and welfare to be associated across individuals.  We then discuss our
approach to modeling the data and present our results.  The final section concludes.
2.  Personal power and welfare in theory
We assume that a person's perceived power depends in part on his effort to participate in
certain institutions.  These may be explicitly political institutions or neighborhood or work-
related institutions.  The effort to participate is costly to the individual, though there are also
direct welfare benefits. The characteristics  of a person (education,  age, location and so on) can
influence both the costs and benefits of acquiring power.  We initially ignore households  and
treat each individual as an "island," though we relax this later.
The power acquired by a person making effort e with characteristics x is  p = ;r(e,  x),
diffused throughout society" (p.959). Yet Gibson's data set contain rather few covariates, and it is unclear
to what extent his conclusion derives from this limitation of his data.
6where the function  ir  is strictly increasing and  at least weakly concave in effort.  The cost is
c(e, x),  which is assumed to be strictly increasing and at least weakly convex in effort.  (These
curvature assumptions can be relaxed somewhat without changing the main results.)
Power is valued positively.  This may be because it directly raises personal consumption
opportunities,  or it may be valued independently of consumption.  Let y denote exogenous
income, meaning that component of income that is unaffected by power.  We use the term "net
income" to refer to exogenous income net of the cost of acquiring power.  Utility is a strictly
increasing function of both net income and power, namely u[y - c(e,x),  ir(e,x)]. A special case
is when  ir(e,  x)  is the income gain due to power, which is not valued independently  of
consumption,  so utility is simply an increasing  concave function of y - c(e, x) + ;r(e, x).
The function  u is assumed to be strictly quasi-concave  in its two arguments.  We also
assume that there are diminishing returns to consumption, non-increasing  returns to power and
that higher power (income) does not decrease the marginal utility of income (power) i.e.,  uyp  2 0
(though these assumptions too can be weakened somewhat without changing the main results).
The chosen level of effort,  e(y, x),  maximizes u[y - c(e, x),  r(e, x)],  which requires that
UyCe  = Upire  (using subscripts to denote partial derivatives).  It is readily verified that:
ey =(uyyce  -UypCe)J  >0  (1)
e1 =  [(Uy,r x  - UyYCx)ce +  UyCex + (Uypcx  -u pprx )re  -Up1 ex  (2)
where
J=-u  c 2 - 2u  ;r  c  - u  c  + u  nr  + u  , 2 < 0
J  yye  yp  e  e  y ee  p  ee  pp  e
The derived level of power at optimal effort is:
7where  py = ireey > 0  andpx = ireex  +  TIx . The derived  level of utility at optimal effort is:
v(y,x)  = u[y - c(e(y,x),x),  p(y,x)]  (4)
where  vy  = uY  > 0  and  vX = -uYcX  + up,r,.
While it is reasonable  to assume that p(y, x)  is the continuous variable that people have
in mind when they answer the PLQ, there can be no presumption that answers to the WLQ are
based solely on utility.  The maximand for choice need not coincide with perceptions of poverty.
Nor can we assume that answers to the WLQ are based on y or y - c(e, x) ; people may think that
this is too narrow a basis for distinguishing "poor" from "rich".6 Instead, we assume that the
WLQ is based on a more general definition of "welfare" represented by:
w = wJu(y - c(e,x), ;r(e,x)),x]  (5)
The function w is strictly increasing in utility, but can also vary with x independently of utility.
Notice that while maximizing  w yields exactly the same effort function  (such that  uyce = Up7Te),
it could clearly behave in very different ways to v(y, x)  or y, given heterogeneity in x.7 So
power might be correlated highly with income or utility but not welfare, as given by (5).
Since both power and utility are welfare increasing in income in the above model, we can
expect a strong association between power and welfare amongst otherwise identical individuals,
through the joint effect of income differences.  Decreasing returns to effort in augmenting power
will tend to yield a concave relationship between power and individual  income.  Against this
6  This echoes  Sen's (1987) well-known critique of both "utility" and "income" interpretations of
the "standard of living."
7  This is formally similar to the well-known problem of identifying utility from demand behavior,
as discussed in (inter alia) Pollak (1991)  and Browning (1993).
8effect, the income effect on effort can be either increasing or decreasing in income. For power to
be concave in income we require that the income effect on effort is not too convex; specifically
that  e.  < -r,e 2 /I  7te (> 0).  Then higher income inequality (in the usual sense of mean
preserving spreads) will tend to reduce aggregate power as well as welfare (given our standard
assumptions of diminishing marginal utility of income).  One can conjecture that there may also
be effects of inequality on the distribution of individual power or welfare, through the vector x.
For example, highly unequal societies may come with greater repression of the political
freedoms of the poor, raising the cost of political effort and reducing its benefits.
The extent of congruence is less clear for "non-income"  characteristics.  Two extreme
cases will serve to illustrate the range of theoretical possibilities.
Case 1: Power and welfare respond identically to differences in non-income
characteristics.  We give two examples for this case.  In the first and simplest example, power
has no intrinsic value and so it only raises welfare through its effect on consumption, which is all
the matters to welfare (i.e., w = u ). In addition, suppose that:
(i) the power function is strictly concave in effort and additively separable  between effort
and characteristics  (7[ex = 0);
(ii) the cost of effort depends  solely on the amount of effort ( cx  = 0)
Then it is immediate that  ex  = 0  and that  px = irx while  vx  = uy;r..  The monetary value of the
welfare effect of a change in x is simply given by its effect on power.
To give a second example of Case 1, suppose instead that:
(i) welfare is utility, which is additively separable between consumption and power
9(uyp = 0) and linear in power (upp = 0);
(ii) the cost and power functions are also additively separable (c,  = z  = 0);
(iii) both power and its cost are linear in effort (,re = 0  and  cee = 0).
Then it is immediate from (2) that e. = -CX  / Ce.  Recalling that px = ree.  + ;r.,  it follows that
Px = -uyCX  +  +rx  = vX  (using the fact that optimal effort requires that  uyce = Upier).  So in this
special case, power and welfare commove perfectly with differences  in individual characteristics.
Case 2: Power and welfare respond oppositely to non-income characteristics. As
already noted, there may well be welfare effects of differences in x at given  y - c(e, x)  and
ir(e, x) . However, even without these differences, one can readily construct special cases in
which the effects go in opposite directions.  Suppose that:
(i) the cost of political participation depends solely on one's effort, i.e.,  cx  = 0, and
(ii) there is a single non-income characteristic  and more of  this characteristic  enhances
power at given effort (;rx  > 0) and does not decrease welfare at given utility.
So higher x entails higher welfare.  The effect on power is ambiguous, however.  The key
unknown  is how the non-income characteristic  interacts with effort.  Does higher x raise or lower
the impact of differences in effort on power?  (Or, equivalently,  does greater effort magnify or
attenuate the power differences  associated with differences in x?)  It is readily verified that the
necessary and sufficient condition for power to also be increasing in x is that:
[ex  >  Jr e(Uypce  UppAe)]  O  (6)
ieup
If higher x enhances the power returns to effort ( ,rex  > 0 ) then clearly power and welfare will
10respond the same way to differences  in x.  However, with a negative interaction effect  ( Ira <  )
it is possible for power to be decreasing in x.  This happens when higher x so reduces the
marginal impact of extra effort on power that the optimal level of effort falls enough to entail
lower realized power. Then, at given income, welfare and power will be negatively correlated.
The above discussion has looked at individuals in isolation. Will introducing households
into the picture strengthen or weaken the association between personal power and welfare?  If
one assumes that both power and welfare are at least partially shared within households then the
effect on the correlation between power and welfare across individuals will depend on the sorting
process in household formation. If people with characteristics that yield low (high) power tend to
match with people whose characteristics  yield low (high) welfare then household fornation will
strengthen the correlation  across individuals.  On the other hand, if gains from trade are the
dominant factor, such that initial inequalities in power between partners are at least partly offset
by opposing welfare inequalities, then the correlation will be weakened.
However,  the assumption that power and welfare are shared is not obviously plausible.
There are two points to note.  Firstly, while income transfers can allow sharing of economic
welfare, the one redistributive instrument will not be sufficient to average out the differences in
both power and welfare when people whose characteristics  yield low power and high welfare
prior to household formation pair up with those holding high power but low welfare. Another
instrument would then be needed.  Sharing knowledge relevant to power could serve this role.
Secondly, it may not be in the interests of the person with greater power to share that
power within the household.  Sharing knowledge relevant to power may switch the intra-
household allocation of resources against the individual's interests.  Analogously to the model ofBasu et al. (2002) on whether literacy is shared, if preferences  differ sufficiently between the
person with power and the person without it then power sharing will not occur.
The above discussion has suggested a number of reasons why there might be only a weak
association between self-rated power and welfare.  An important source of ambiguity is likely to
lie in how power and welfare are jointly affected by "non-income" characteristics,  and also in
how these characteristics  come to be associated through household formation. We will next see
what our data for Russia suggest about the empirical association between power and welfare.
3.  Evidence for Russia
We use the November-December  2000 and October  1998 rounds of the Russian
Longitudinal Monitoring  Survey (RLMS) obtainable from the RLMS web site:
http://www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/rlms/rlms  home.html. This covered a sample (in 2000) of 3800
households  (8300 adults; 6700 with data for 1998).
All adults in the sampled households  were asked the PLQ and WLQ given in the
introduction. In both cases, we decided to condense the highest 7th, 8th,  and 9th rungs into one,
because only a small number of respondents (less than one percent in both cases) put themselves
on rungs 8 and 9.  So, we treat the data as two seven-rung Cantril ladders.
Table  1 summarizes responses  to the WLQ and PLQ from the 2000 survey. The row total
gives the number of respondents  in each power rung, while the column totals are for welfare.  A
standard measure of association for contingency tables is Cramer's V, which tests the null
hypothesis of no association between the row variable and the column variable in the table (see,
for example, Agresti,  1984). Cramer's V takes a value between 0 (no relationship)  and 1 (perfect
correlation).  The value for the sample as a whole implied by Table 1 is 0.336 (with a
12bootstrapped standard error of 0.006).  For males, it is 0.331  (standard error of 0.009) while it is
0.343 (standard error of 0.009) for females. So we find a significant positive association between
power ranks and welfare ranks. However, the matching between the two is clearly far from
perfect. For example, of the 240 individuals who put themselves on the highest welfare rung, less
than a half answered that they have the most power. For the poorest group 24% of respondents
indicated that they did not see themselves as being the least powerful. On inspecting Table 1, it is
evident that the greater source of mismatching is in the upper off-diagonal than the lower one,
i.e., there are many people who do not think of themselves as poor but who feel relatively
powerless.  This pattern holds for both men and women.
In Table 2 we use the panel nature of the data to compare changes in power ranks with
changes in welfare ranks from 1998 to 2000. (There were a few individuals whose welfare  and/or
power perceptions changed by more than four rungs between 2000 and 1998. We combine these
into the top (+4) and the bottom (-4) categories.)  Amongst all surveyed adults, 42.5% registered
a higher ladder rung for their power in 2000 than 1998, while 45.3% did so for their welfare. On
the other hand, 28.4% registered a lower power rung, and 25.5% showed a lower welfare rung.
On associating the changes, we find that amongst those who felt that their power rose by a rung
or more, 63.5% also registered a higher rung of the welfare  ladder, while only 14.1%  felt that
their welfare had fallen. For those who registered a higher welfare rung, 59.6% also said that
their power was at least one rung higher, while only  16.3% said that it had fallen a rung or more.
There is a significant correlation overall; the Cramer's V for the sample as a whole is 0.223
(standard error of 0.006), while it is 0.208 (0.009) and 0.239 (0.009) for males and females
respectively. The fact that we still find a significant association in the changes over time tells us
13that the correlation  in the levels evident in Table  1 is not entirely due to a common time-invariant
individual effect, such as due to the respondent's  personality.
4.  Speciflcation  of a model  of subjective  power and welfare
In principle,  one can identify a causal effect of perceived power on perceived welfare if
there is a valid instrumental  variable (IV) that is correlated with welfare but not correlated with
power given welfare and other observed covariates.  However, we do not believe a valid IV exists
for this problem. Any variable that one can imagine as an influence on power would surely also
be a potential influence on welfare independently of power.  For example, where one lives will
no doubt influence one's perceived welfare, but it could also influence power at given welfare,
such as when areas differ in how much power over decision making is decentralized.
Instead we ask whether welfare and power share common covariates. Is there any
variable that influences one but not the other, or has opposing effects?  How much of the
empirical association  found in the last section is attributable to differences  in the ways that these
variables respond to observed covariates, versus other (latent) factors?
We build the analysis on explicit assumptions about the underlying continuous variables
determining where one sees oneself on the ladder from "poor" to "rich" or from "least powerful"
to "most powerful".  The continuous variables for welfare and power (w andp) are assumed to
be determined in part by functions f  w (y  , y') and  f  I (yi, y') of individual income (yl ) and
h household per capita (y1 ). We also allow for a vector of observable variables (x) that affect
welfare and power at given incomes.  In addition, we allow for unobservable  variables, which we
will lump into independent and identically normally distributed error terms  g,w  and  Cf.  Our
14empirical models corresponding to equations (3) and (5)  are then:
Pi =f  P(yi,Y  y)+xiP  +eip  (7.1)
w  =f W(y Ih)+xflw+eW  (7.2)
The impacts of inequality depend on the curvature of the functions  f  W  (yi, yh )  and  f  P (y,  yh
if the functions are strictly concave then inequality (in the sense of a mean-preserving  spread)
lowers mean power or welfare (section 2).  In our estimation we assume that the functions
f W (yi,y)  and  f  P  (y,  yh)  are second degree polynomials:8
fp(yi,  ))=alPy 1 +ca  (yi) 2 +pjp"yY  +82p(yh) 2 (8.1)
f  w(yi yh )= aiy + a2 (yi  )2 +  I'yw  +  w  (Yh) 2 (8.2)
Assuming level comparability of the ladder across persons,  someone with w < cl (say)
will respond that she is on the first rung of the economic ladder, while someone  for whom cl  < w
< c2 will be on the second, and so on up to the highest rung. Similarly,  someone withp < al will
respond that he is on the first rung of the power ladder, someone with a, < p < a2 will respond
that he is on the second rung, etc. Given our assumption that the error terms are normally
distributed, we can use an ordered probit to model the responses.
The effect of higher individual income on w and p can be decomposed into a direct effect
(holding household income constant) and an indirect effect (via the change in household
income).  In a strict polling model of household decision making, the direct effect would be
absent. Under our functional  form assumptions,  the effect of a gain in individual income holding
8  We tested an altemative functional  form that included interactions between the individual and
household incomes. The interaction term coefficients were insignificantly  different from zero in our
estimations and we decided to proceed with the simpler specification.
15other incomes in the household (yj  ni - y, ) constant is given by:
O'p  =[aP  +2aPyj]+[j6P  +2j6Pyj/n  (9.1)
-=  [alw  + 2aw'yj] +L0 1
1 ' + 23w2fyh ]  /nj  (9.2)
ay,
To interpret these derivatives, notice that when individual income increases (decreases) it in turn
increases  (decreases) total household income. Thus the individual income  effect comprises an
effect arising from the change in individual income keeping the household income constant (the
first of the right-hand-side terms in (9.1)  and (9.2)), plus the effect via the change in household
income (second of the right-hand-side terms in (9.1)  and (9.2)).
5.  Covariates of power and welfare
The income variable we use is total monthly disposable income, which includes wages
and salaries, social security, private transfers, and imputed income in-kind and from home
production.  We initially assume that all income is exogenous to power, though we relax this
later. To convert to real values we use region specific  deflators based on Popkin et al., (1995).
We also include geographic dummy variables that can help pick up errors in the deflators due to
any omitted cost-of-living differences.  The RLMS also includes household and individual
characteristics of the respondents, which we use to control for heterogeneity at given incomes.
The vector of  explanatory  variables includes individual characteristics such as respondents'  age,
age squared,  dummy variables for education  achievements and marital status. The demographic
characteristics include the household size and size squared, and the shares of children, adult
women and pensioners in the household.
16We also examine the effect of employment status.  A number of papers have found that
unemployment lowers subjective welfare, even at given (current) incomes (Clark and Oswald,
1994; Oswald,  1997; Blanchflower and Oswald,  1997; Winkelmann  and Winkelmann,  1998).
There is less evidence on the effect on power and arguments have been made that point in both
directions.  The Marxian literature  has viewed wage labor as "alienating."  Against this view, it
can be argued that (ceteris  paribus)  an unemployed person would feel less control over the
things that matter to his welfare than someone with a job. Ross and Mirowsky (1992) find
evidence of positive effects on perceived power of employment in the U.S.
We also include a dummy variable for whether the respondent is Russian or not (85%  of
the sample is Russian).  Survey evidence for Western  Europe and North America suggest that
minorities often face discrimination and social exclusion that attenuates perceived welfare and
power.  For example, Ross and Mirowsky (1992)  find that minority groups in the U.S. tend to
have less "sense of control" over their lives.  It is not clear, however, that the Russian setting
would be similar in this respect, given that the minority groups in Russia typically did not stem
from a history of migration (voluntary or otherwise) to deal with labor shortages.  In a,sample of
1,500 Soviet adults in 1990, Gibson (1993) finds that perceptions of governmental repression
and self-censorship are uncorrelated with minority status (indeed, the reported (simple)
correlation  coefficients are less than 0.005 in both cases).  Gibson's comparisons with similar
data for the U.S. indicate  larger differences in perceived constraints  on political freedom between
whites and African-Americans  than found amongst Soviet citizens in 1990s.  (Gibson's results
suggest that African-Americans  see themselves as absolutely less free than Soviet citizens.)
We also estimate a model in which we add attitudinal variables related to self-reported
17health status and expectations about the future, following earlier work on subjective welfare in
Russia (Ravallion and Lokshin, 2002).  There are obvious concerns  about the endogeneity of
these variables.  However, it will still be of interest to study their correlations with subjective
power and welfare, and how their inclusion in the regressions  affects other coefficients.
Summary statistics on the set of covariates we will use are given in Table 3.
6.  Results
For the total sample,  and for the samples of males and females separately,  Table 4
presents the results of the ordered probits for welfare and power (this is the basic specification,
without the attitudinal variables to be included later).  Before we discuss the detailed results in
Table 4, it is of interest to test the overall fit, by comparing the actual distributions of
respondents across the welfare and power ladders with the models' predicted distributions. The
results are given in Table 5. (We explain the simulated distributions in Table 5 below.)  The fit is
clearly quite good.  Indeed,  for power, the actual and predicted distributions across the ladder
rungs are identical when rounded off to the nearest percentage point.  This holds for males and
females separately,  as well as the full sample.  The fit is equally good for welfare on the full
sample,  though when we split by gender a few cases emerge in which a difference  in the
distribution across ladder rungs persists when rounded off to the nearest percentage point.
6.1  Income effects
Focusing first on results for the total sample in Table 4, we see that in all cases the
coefficients on the income variables indicate a concave relationship (as implied by the significant
negative coefficient  on the squared term). Figure 1 shows how the empirical  functions
f  W  (yi, y') and  f I (yi, y  )  vary with household income evaluated at each data point for
18individual  income.  On the graph we superimpose the non-parametrically  estimated density of
household per capita income (right vertical  axes) on the scatter plot, while on the vertical (left)
axes we graph the value of the function calculated  for every level of household per capita income
(horizontal  axis) and individual income (the scatter points).
We find a positive relationship with household income over the bulk of the data, and it
tends to be steeper for welfare than power. This also holds for individual income (Figure 2).  We
find a strong indication for both power and welfare that the latent continuous variable is concave
in income. Thus higher inequality (in the usual sense of mean-preserving spreads) reduces both
aggregate power and aggregate welfare.
To measure the contribution of inequality we simulate the effect on power and welfare of
equalizing incomes.  We do this in two ways.  First we equalize incomes within households, so
that actual individual incomes are replaced by the individual's own household income per capita;
we then calculate the predicted distributions across welfare and power ladders.  Secondly, we
repeat this for full equalization of income per person across households.
Table 5 gives the results for these simulations.  Even with complete equalization  of
incomes there is only a small drop in the proportion of respondents who rate themselves as being
amongst the least powerful; the proportionate impact on the number who rate themselves  as
being on the poorest rung is only slightly greater than for power.9 Partial  equalization within
families naturally has less impact, though a noticeably greater impact on the perceived power of
women than men.  (For women,  modal power shifts up one rung with either partial or complete
9  Notice that income equalization  does not reduce the number in the most powerful cell in all cases;
this is because the quadratic  function reaches its maximum prior to the maximum income; however, there
are very few observations above the turning point.
19income equalization; but the quantitative effect is small.)
To help understand the individual income effect we do the decompositions in equation
(9) at the mean values of individual income, total household per capita income, and household
size for the total sample and for the samples of males and females. The results  are given in Table
6. For the whole sample,  81% of the individual effect on perceived power is direct while the rest
is transmitted via the gain in household income. For welfare the effect accounts  for 73% of the
income effect on welfare.  The share that is indirect (via household income) is higher for women
than men.  However, the simple pooling model is clearly rejected for both men and women.
6.2  Other covariates
A number of significant covariates  are found at given incomes. Male respondents tend to
have higher perceived power, but there is no such difference in perceived welfare by gender.
Younger respondents feel that they have less power (the maximum perceived power is attained at
about 75 years of age) and have lower subjective welfare (the maximum is at the age of 65).
Living in larger households increases  subjective perceptions of both power and welfare.  The
presence of children 0-6 years of age in the household increases welfare and power.
Non-Russians in the sample tend to have higher perceived power and welfare; the effect
is stronger for power than welfare, and stronger for males than females. This is not consistent
with the arguments and evidence  for Western Europe and North America, pointing to
discrimination and social exclusion amongst minorities.  As we have noted, the Russian setting is
possibly rather different in this respect.  It remains puzzling, however, that Russians see
themselves as less powerful and with lower welfare than others.  Possibly we are picking up a
personality or cultural trait with little relationship to objective circumstances.
20We find a strong effect of education on power and welfare.  Individuals with university
degrees and with technical or vocational degrees have significantly higher power and welfare in
comparison to respondents with only a high school diploma. The effect of education is almost
twice as high for power than for welfare.
Being unemployed lowers both power and welfare, though the effect of employment
status is larger in the case of welfare.
Coefficients  on the regional dummies indicate significant geographical  effects on both
power and welfare.  Geographic proximity to the seat of political power clearly matters.
Respondents  from almost all regions feel less powerful than the respondents living in Moscow
and Saint Petersburg,  but the regional differences are generally less pronounced (and less
significant statistically) for welfare.
Comparing the results for males and females reveals that while male welfare and power
peaks around the age of 60, female power and welfare  are increasing functions of age over the
whole range of the data. We observe a stronger effect of education on the perceived power of
males than females, but this difference disappears for welfare.  Being divorced has a stronger
(negative) effect on both power and welfare for women, though the effects  are not statistically
significant. Similarly to the results for the total sample, being unemployed decreases power and
welfare for both men and women. However, the effect of unemployment on power is stronger for
women than men, while the welfare effect is similar.  Living in larger households has a positive
and significant impact on the subjective power and welfare of females, but for males this effect is
not significant. The presence of children age 0 to 6 years of age increases the perceived welfare
of women, but does not have any significant effect on men's welfare.  Having more women in
21the household increases perceived power and welfare of men (though the effects cannot be
considered statistically significant), but has no effect for women.
While we have noted a number of differences, broadly speaking our results suggest that
the factors that determine subjective perceptions of economic welfare have similar effects on
perceptions of power.  Figure 3 shows the plots of the predicted  levels of welfare and power. The
two are strongly correlated for the total sample as well as for the samples of males and females
separately. The correlation between these two indicators is stronger for females; the correlation
coefficient  for female predicted perceptions is 0.940 (with a standard error of 0.013)  as compared
to 0.875 (with the standard error of 0.033) for males.
6.3  Alternative specifications
One possible concern  about the above results is that income may be exogenous  in the
regressions for power.  In particular,  it might be argued that higher personal power has a positive
effect on income thus biasing our results. There is no obvious identification  strategy;  any
potential instrument for individual income would be a potential covariate of welfare or power.
However, we do not need to identify the structural relationship for the present purposes.  To test
whether our conclusions would hold under a different specification we simply re-estimate our
model excluding the respondent's own income. Thus we drop the individual's own income and
replace household income with its value net of the individual's income.  This assumes that the
endogeneity problem is individual-specific, i.e., that it does not spillover to the incomes of other
household members.
The results are in Table 7. The main findings described above are quite robust to this
change.  One notable exception is that the squared term on income is no longer significant for
22power; we cannot reject the null that the income effect is linear for power. Again we find that
power and welfare perceptions  are strongly correlated in the total sample for which the
correlation  coefficient between predicted values is 0.931 (with a standard error of 0.012);  in the
samples of males the correlation  is 0.829 (0.029) and for females it is 0.944 (0.015).
Table 8 gives the extended specification  in which we add the attitudinal variables on
health and expectations for the future to the basic model in Table 4.  For the WLQ the results
echo earlier findings (Ravallion and Lokshin, 2002), namely that perceived ill-health reduces
subjective welfare as does the expectation that things will get worse in the future.  When we use
these as additional regressors for PLQ we again find considerable agreement  in how they impact
on power and welfare.  Ill-health attenuates perceived power as do expectations that things will
get worse in the future.  Other coefficients  are reasonably robust with one notable exception:  the
significant positive effect of being male on perceived power vanishes in the extended model; this
effect is  attributable to the attitudinal difference.  Again we find high correlations between the
predicted values of power and welfare;  for the full sample the correlation coefficient is 0.943
(standard error of 0.010), while it is 0.906 (0.022)  for males and 0.950 (0.011)  for females.
We explored further why the gender effect on power vanishes when we control for the
attitudinal differences.  On only adding the expectations variables the gender effect on power
remains.  On only adding the health variables the gender difference in power becomes
insignificant.  So the gender difference in perceived power is largely accountable  to the fact that
women tend to see themselves as less healthy than men (Table 3).
7.  Conclusions
If "empowerment"  of specific  groups in society is to be seen as a distinct policy objective
23to reducing poverty or inequality in terms of economic welfare then one should be able to
establish that power is allocated differently.  But how can we assess how power is assigned to
people?  We have tried to see what can be learnt from self-perceptions of power as reported in an
unusual data set for Russia, which combined subjective data on power and welfare with the
standard objective data collected in socio-economic  surveys.
We find that the self-assessed power of Russian adults is significantly correlated with
their economic welfare, both as they perceive it and by conventional objective measures.  It could
hardly be deemed a very strong correlation.  Consider those people on the lowest two rungs of
the subjective welfare ladder (about the poorest quarter of the sample) and those on the lowest
rung of the power ladder (also about one quarter).  We find that only about half those who are
poor by this definition see themselves as powerless.  The main reason why the correlation is not
stronger is that many people (both men and women) who do not see themselves  as poor feel that
they have little power.  We find that 42% of the sample placed themselves on a lower rung of the
power ladder than of the welfare ladder; by contrast, less than half as many (18%) put
themselves on a higher power rung than their welfare rung. The scope for empowerment  in
Russia is clearly not confined to the poor, at least as they perceive it.
When we look at the changes over time, we also find a statistically significant correlation
between power and welfare. Perceived welfare  gains (losses) are more likely to come with gains
(losses) in perceived power.  For only 13% of respondents did perceived welfare and perceived
power move in the opposite direction between  1998 and 2000.  However, it remains that 40% of
those who felt that their welfare had risen by a rung or more did not feel that they had reached a
higher rung on the power ladder. And a slightly smaller proportion of those who felt that their
24power had risen by a rung or more did not feel that they had risen on the welfare ladder.
The seemingly weak (though still significant) unconditional  association that we find
between power and welfare in both levels and changes might be taken to suggest that there is
ample scope for an empowerment policy agenda that is qualitatively different to that for raising
economic welfare.  However, this is not so clear when we turn to modeling the power and
welfare rankings as functions of observed (objective) covariates.  Indeed, we are struck by the
similarity in observable covariates.  Granted, we do find some differences.  For example, gender is
more important to power that it is to welfare, with women feeling that they have less power
ceteris paribus;  this effect  is largely attributable to differences  in perceived health; controlling
for this difference (and other covariates) there is no significant gender effect on perceived power.
To give another example,  unemployment reduces power more that it reduces welfare (though it
is a strong determinant of both).
Nonetheless, looking at the results as a whole, we are drawn to conclude that there is
strong agreement in how perceptions of power and welfare react to differences  in individual and
household characteristics.  The predicted values show a very high correlation (around 0.9, and
even higher for men and women separately).  The much weaker unconditional correlation
between perceived power and perceived welfare is driven by idiosyncratic factors that are not
readily accountable in terms of observable  characteristics  in our survey.  The fact that the
characteristics  that are good for raising individual economic welfare are also good for
empowerment  (albeit with some subtle differences) suggests that any scope for distinct policies
largely rests with the idiosyncratic differences that we have not been able to account for.  It
remains unclear to what extent those differences are amenable to policy.
25Amongst the covariates  we have focused on, the importance of income is notable since it
is the variable that many economic events and policies act through.  Higher income tends to
come with greater perceived power as well as higher welfare.  The bulk of the individual income
effect is via own income rather than through household income, implying a clear rejection of the
simple pooling model (though less so for women than men). There are diminishing returns to
income for both power and welfare (though for power, this is not robust to specification
changes).  Consistently with seemingly plausible theoretical  assumptions, the curvature of the
relationship with income indicates that income inequality attenuates both aggregate power and
welfare,  though the effect is not quantitatively large.
While our results suggest that income differences matter similarly to both power and
welfare, that does not justify a narrow  focus on incomes.  Echoing past work in the literature, we
find many significant covariates of welfare at given incomes, suggesting that peoples'
perceptions of how "poor" they are affected by many other things than their incomes, either
individually or at the household level.  What is striking about our findings is that these same
things also determine their perceptions of power.
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29Table.1: Contingency table ofwelfare  and power ranks,'Russla'2000
(a) FuU sample
Cramer's V=0.336  Welfare rank  ._.
1  2  3  4  S  6t  7
(Poorest)  (Richest)  Total
I(Leastpowerfl)  356  386  216  202  36  15  1840
2  98  410  261  199  22  8  1512
40  183  371  288  61  17  1605
o  4  26  63  219  268  92  12  1216
Aw  5  26  35  157  233  130  38  1386
6  4  9  26  7  9  48  388
7 (Most powerful)  3  8  18  30  68  91  320
Total  826  1168  1861  1724  1889  559  240  8267
(b) Males only
Cramer's V=0.331  Welfare rank
1  2  3  4  5  67
(Poorest)  (Richest)  Total
I (Leastpowerful)  122  149  90  77  13  6  705
.2  35  180  114  87  10  4  637
73,  16  67  173  127  34  9  729
'4  9  36  .1  8  118  31  5  537
5{  S  9  19  77  106  61  20  653.
6  2  7  10  3  51  29  187
i7  (Mo;rpowerful)  1  4  8  19  37  43  157
Total  320  462  832  771  858  244  118  3605
30(c) Females only
Cramer's V=0.343  Welfare rank
1  2  3  4  S  6  7
(Poorest)  (Richest)
1 (Leastpowerful)  234  237  126  125  23  9  1135
2  230  147  112  12  4  875
3  24  1166  i98  i61  27  8  876
¢  4  17  27  11  4  150  61  7  679
;  5  17  16  80  127J  69  18  733
6  2  2  16  41  46  19  201
7 (Most powerful)  2  4  10  11  31  48  163
Totd  506  706  1029  953  1031  315  122  4662
31Table',2: Movements  up and down the pbwer and welfare  ladders, 1998-2000
(a)  Full sample
Cramier's V =0.212  Change In welfare rank
-4  -3  -2  -1  0  +1  +2  +3  +4 Total
.4  19  27'  44  70'  32'  26  15  7  324
,"-43  30  '23  ,9  i  0  195
- ,  2  11  2  7  '  94  130  63  18  13  7  437
15  30,  82  265  169  62  20  ;9  858
'a  0  26'  21  98  398'  193  '  75  ,31  1853
'  ,  '+1 ,  ,7  17  44  148  316  370  178  69  33  1182 1  +2  5  7  25  68  151  203  190  74  32  755
+3  4  2  9  34  88  82  86  81  30  416
+4  3  *2  4  8  52  95  80  '43  361
Total  166  150  406  903  1865  1435  842  .391  223  6381
'(b) Males only
Cramer's V'=0.203,  Cbange l_'welfare rank,,
-4  -3  -2  -I  0  +1  +2  +3  +4 Total
.-4  8  14  21  25  14  5  8  3  134
-3  4  15  27  13  3  0  085
. 2  4  '  ''  ~~449'  53  '  28,  ' 12  '  '7  5  204
*  /  ,  6  15  38  126  63  28  7,  3  372
at'  0  ,  11  8  46  107  152  76  30',  10  '740
i  >'  +1  4  10.  22  60  143  1'58  77  21  16  511
31  +2  3  5  4  32  .65  92  73  27  14  315
+3  '2  1  4  16'  43  38  33  35  15  187
2  'O  4  4  22  39'  35  17  147
Total  73  66  181  390  804  597  342  '152  ,90  2695
32(b) Females only
CrameP's'V =0.2i3  ,Change  In welfare rank
-4  -3  -2  -1  0  ;+1  ,  +2  ,  +3  '+4 Total
,  4  ~~~~~11  13  23  45  18  21  7  '  4  i90 '-4
29  15  26  10  '6  1"  0  110.
|'  2  1  ~  ~~~7  16  45  77  35  ,'6.  6  2  233 -2
9  15  44  139  106  34  13  6  486
L  '  0  15  '13,  52  164  246  117  45'  21  .:1113
+1  3  7  22  88  173  212,  101  48  17  671
+2  2  2  21  36  86  1l1  117  47  18  '440
2  1  5  18  45,  44  53  46  15  229
+4  1  2  0,  4  30  56  45  26  214
Totl  93  84  225  513  1061  838  500  239  133  3686
33Table 3: Summary statistics
Full sample  Males  Females
Mean  Std. Err.  Mean  Std. Err.  Mean  Std. Err.
Income per capita  0.14  0.21  0.144  0.215  0.138  0.205
Individual income  0.13  0.211  0.163  0.255  0.105  0.164
Individual characteristics
Male  0.436  -
Age  42.61  18.54  40.46  17.44  44.28  19.18
Education dummies
Non-Russian  0.152  - 0.154  - 0.152  -
High school  0.518  - 0.549  - 0.494  -
Technical or vocational  0.322  - 0.299  - 0.34  -
University  0.153  - 0.15  - 0.156  -
Marital  status dummies
Single  0.188  - 0.216  - 0.166  -
Married  0.625  - 0.709  - 0.561  -
Divorced  0.068  - 0.043  - 0.088  -
Widowed  0.117  - 0.031  - 0.184  -
Self-evaluation of  health
Very good  0.023  - 0.034  - 0.015  -
Good  0.262  - 0.328  - 0.212  -
Normal  0.540  - 0.508  - 0.564  -
Bad  0.142  - 0.109  - 0.168  -
Very bad  0.032  - 0.020  - 0.041  -
Expectations about life
Expects  to live better  0.228  - 0.248  - 0.212  -
Expects no changes  0.546  - 0.542  - 0.548  -
Expects to live worse  0.226  - 0.210  - 0.239  -
Household  characteristics
Household  size  3.328  1.559  3.47  1.516  3.219  1.582
Share of children 0-6 years old  0.056  0.117  0.056  0.117  0.056  0.118
Share of children 6-14 years old  0.148  0.19  0.15  0.188  0.147  0.191
Share of adult women  0.286  0.214  0.259  0.176  0.308  0.237
Share of pensioners  0.244  0.363  0.211  0.341  0.269  0.377
Regional  dummies
Rural households  0.284  - 0.285  - 0.283  -
Moscow and Saint Petersburg  0.048  - 0.048  - 0.047  -
Northem and Northwest  0.066  - 0.065  - 0.067  -
Central Black-Earth  0.197  - 0.191  - 0.201  -
Volga-Vaytski and Volga  0.191  - 0.192  - 0.191  -
North Caucasian  0.145  - 0.149  - 0.141  -
Ural  0.151  - 0.148  - 0.154  -
Westem Siberian  0.098  - 0.098  - 0.097  -
Eastem Siberia and Far East  0.104  - 0.108  - 0.101  -
N  8266  3538  4728
34Table 4: Ordered probits for power and welfare ranks
Full sample  Males  . Females
Power rank  Welfare rank  Power rank  Welfare rank  Power rank  Welfare rank
Coeff.  S.Err. Coeff.  S.Err.  Coeff.  S.Err.  Coeff.  S Err.  Coeff.  S.Err.  Coeff.  S.Err.
Income per capita  1.270  0.237  2.363  0.229  1.462  0.379  2.316  0.362  1.105  0.309  2.400  0.299
Income per capita2  -1.019  0 296  -1612  0.280  -1.652  0.480  -1.713  0.444  -0.656  0.388  -1.629  0.366
Individual income  1.144  0.220  1.478  0.217  0.899  0.313  1.741  0.309  1.376  0.323  1.214  0.318
Individual  income2  -1.048  0.295  -1.232  0.291  -0.813  0.399  -1.738  0.394  -1.143  0.454  -0.532  0.449
Individual characteristics
Male  0.056  0.026  -0.014  0.026
Female  Reference
Age  -0.029  0.004  -0.040  0.004  -0.038  0.007  -0.046  0.007  -0.023  0.005  -0.035  0.005
Age2/100  0.020  0.005  0.030  0.004  0.031  0.008  0.038  0.008  0.013  0.006  0.025  0.005
Smgle  Reference
Married  -0.005  0.046  0.100  0.045  0.048  0.078  0.138  0.077  -0.066  0 063  0.029  0.062
Divorced  -0.069  0.064  -0.069  0.062  0.038  0.113  0.034  0.110  -0.117  0.079  -0.117  0.077
Widowed  -0.052  0.065  -0.069  0.063  0.111  0.136  -0.061  0.133  -0.094  0.079  -0.092  0.076
Unemployed  -0.183  0.045  -0.258  0.044  -0.124  0.062  -0.263  0.061  -0.238  0.066  -0.231  0.065
Russian  Reference
Non-Russian  0.188  0.035  0.140  0.034  0.270  0.053  0.216  0.052  0.127  0.046  0.086  0.045
Education
High School  Reference
TechnicaWVocational  0.073  0.028  0.067  0.028  0.124  0.043  0.051  0.043  0035  0.038  0.081  0.037
University  0.316  0.037  0.152  0.037  0.394  0.057  0.160  0.056  0.258  0.050  0.151  0.049
Household characteristics
Household  size  0.070  0.027  0.105  0.026  0.044  0.043  0.088  0.042  0.088  0.036  0.114  0.035
Household  size2  -0.002  0.003  -0.007  0.003  -0.001  0.004  -0.006  0.004  -0.004  0.004  -0.007  0.004
Share of children 0-6 y/o  0.218  0.130  0.332  0,128  0.231  0.208  0.218  0.205  0.183  0.173  0.390  0.170
Share of children 7-14 y/o  -0.082  0.088  0.107  0.086  -0.034  0.136  0.265  0.133  -0.169  0.126  -0.037  0.123
Share of women  0.070  0.092  0.136  0.090  0.214  0.175  0.317  0.172  -0.063  0.131  -0.005  0.128
Share of pensioners  -0.120  0.074  0.104  0.072  -0.110  0.122  0.106  0.120  -0.167  0.106  0.075  0.103
Urban  Reference
Rural  0.040  0.029  0.047  0.028  0.057  0.044  0.040  0,044 I  0.027  0.038  0.051  0.036
Regional dummies
Moscow and St. Petersburg  Reference
Northern and Northwest  -0.306  0072  -0095  0.070  -0.461  0.111  -0.130  0.108  -0.196  0.096  -0.058  0.093
Central Black-Earth  -0.126  0.061  -0.021  0.059  -0.115  0.093  0.056  0.091  -0.137  0.080  -0.070  0.079
Volga-Vaytski  and Volga  -0 123  0.061  -0.052  0.060  -0.144  0.094  -0.043  0.092  -0.115  0.081  -0.055  0.080
North Caucasian  0.155  0.065  0.287  0.064  0.063  0.098  0.220  0.097  0.217  0.086  0.344  0.084
Ural  -0.082  0.063  0.105  0.061  -0.058  0.095  0.144  0.094  -0.100  0.083  0.080  0.081
Western Siberian  -0.090  0.067  0.015  0.066  -0.157  0.103  0070  0.101  -0.046  0.089  -0.021  0.087
Eastern Siberia and Far East  0.010  0.066  0.105  0.065  -0.017  0,100  0.150  0.098  0.030  0.088  0.076  0.086
35Auxiliary parameters
cl  -1.148  0.130  -1.506  0.127  -1.350  0.203  -1.532  0.200  -1.143  0.177  -1.532  0.173
c2  -0.587  0.129  -0.877  0.126  -0.789  0.202  -0.915  0.199  -0.579  0.177  -0.893  0.172
c3  -0.058  0.129  -0.205  0.126  -0.237  0.202  -0.205  0.199  -0.066  0.177  -0.245  0.172
c4  0.383  0.129  0.372  0.126  0.200  0.202  0.381  0.199  0.381  0.177  0.327  0.172
cS  1.142  0.130  1.286  0,127  0.969  0.203  1.305  0.200  1.133  0.178  1.237  0.173
c6  1.581  0.131  1.926  0.129  1.416  0.205  1.908  0.203  1.568  0.179  1.910  0.176
Aldrich-Nelson  pseudo 12  0.138  0.155  0.127  0.147  0.148  0.166
Log likelihood  -13852.034  -13937.598  -6014.005  -5944.830  -7817.901  -7972.113
N  8266  3538  4728
36Table 5: Actual  and predicted distributions of welfare  and power with simulated
distributions under income equality
Power rank  Welfare rank
Rungs  Actual  Predicted  Simulated  Actual  Predicted  Simulated
Intra-  Intra-
household  Complete  household  Complete
income  income  income  income
equality  equality  equality  equality
Lowest  22.68  22.69  22.14  21.87  10.20  10.08  9.76  9.17
It  2  18.40  18.44  18.21  18.34  14.30  14.41  14.08  14.02
E  3  19.51  19.52  19.45  19.66  22.63  22.93  22.59  23.04
"  4  14.72  14.64  14.72  14.86  20.85  20.69  20.63  21.19
3  5  16.57  16.55  16.89  16.90  22.72  22.52  22.90  23.17
X  6  4.57  4.62  4.81  4.73  6.56  6.58  6.92  6.67
Highest  3.54  3.54  3.79  3.62  2.74  2.80  3.12  2.73
Lowest  20.12  20.04  19.85  19.65  9.13  9.33  9.20  8.64
2  17.65  17.70  17.61  17.71  13.04  13.80  13.69  13.63
3  20.47  20.49  20.46  20.62  23.44  22.57  22.45  22.88
A  4  15.07  14.98  15.01  15.11  21.39  20.90  20.86  21.40
5  17.83  17.85  17.97  17.99  23.55  23.37  23.47  23.73
6  5.02  5.07  5.14  5.08  6.48  7.00  7.14  6.90
Highest  3.85  3.86  3.96  3.83  2.97  3.03  3.19  2.82
Lowest  24.61  24.70  23.74  23.41  11.01  10.65  10.18  9.58
2  18.96  18.98  18.59  18.77  15.24  14.87  14.37  14.31
. 3  18.79  18.79  18.68  18.95  22.03  23.19  22.70  23.16
4  14.46  14.38  14.54  14.72  20.44  20.53  20.45  21.03
i^  5  15.63  15.57  16.14  16.16  22.10  21.88  22.47  22.76
6  4.24  4.28  4.59  4.50  6.62  6.26  6.76  6.51
Highest  3.31  3.30  3.72  3.50  2.57  2.62  3.06  2.66
37Table 6: Decomposition  of the individual income effects
Power rank function  Welfare rank  function
Share due to the direct effect  Standard  Share due to the direct effect  Standard
of  individual  Income  error*  of individual Income  error*
Total  0.821  0.081  0.730  0.048
Males  0.827  0.231  0.783  0.103
Fernales  0.791  0.157  0.689  0.132
* Standard Errors  are calculated by the bootstrap method.
38Table 7: Ordered probits for power and welfare  ranks without individual income
Full sample  Males  Females
Power rank  Welfare rank  Power rank  Welfare rank  Power rank  Welfare  rank
Coeff.  S.Err.  Coeff.  S.Err.  Coeff.  S.Err.  Coeff.  S.Err  Coeff.  S.Err.  Coeff.  S Err.
Other income per capita*  0.740  0.216  1.777  0.212  0.684  0.345  1.664  0.337  0.799  0.282  1.933  0.276
Other mcome per capita2 -0.478  0.325  -1.116  0319  -0.953  0.520  -1.156  0.504  -0.267  0.424  -1.195  0.416
Individual characteristics
Male  0.101  0.026  0.059  0.025
Female  Reference
Age  -0.024  0.004  -0.032  0.004  -0.037  0.007  -0.042  0.007  -0.017  0.005  -0.027  0.005
Age2/100  0.015  0.005  0.023  0.004  0.029  0.008  0.034  0.008  0.007  0.006  0.018  0.005
Single  Reference
Marmed  0.034  0.046  0.154  0.045  0.119  0.076  0.279  0.075  4.051  0.063  0.043  0.061
Divorced  4.033  0.064  4.007  0.062  0.072  0.112  0.115  0.110  4.090  0.079  4.079  0.077
Widowed  4.003  0.064  0.014  0.063  0.177  0.135  0.086  0.132  4.068  0.079  -0.054  0.076
Unemployed  4.259  0.044  -0.372  0.043  4.193  0.061  4.386  0.060  4.316  0.065  4.333  0.064
Russian  Reference
Non-Russian  0.189  0.035  0.141  0.034  0.272  0.053  0.220  0.052  0.124  0.046  0.082  0.045
Education
High School  Reference
TechnicaVVocational  0.100  0.028  0.107  0.028  0 144  0.043  0.091  0.042  0.066  0.038  0.121  0.037
Umversity  0.393  0.036  0.272  0.036  0.463  0056  0.285  0.055  0.342  0.048  0.267  0.047
Household characteristics
Household size  0.034  0.028  0.031  0.027  0.022  0.043  0.034  0.042  0.043  0.037  0.032  0.035
Household  size2  0.000  0.003  -0.002  0.003  0.001  0.004  4.002  0.004  0.000  0.004  4.001  0.004
Share of children 0-6 y/o  0.225  0.130  0.368  0.128  0.219  0.208  0.226  0.204  0.183  0.174  0.407  0170
Share ofchildren 7-14 y/o  4.070  0087  0.147  0.086  4.085  0.135  0.176  0.132  4.104  0.126  0.074  0.123
Share of women  0117  0.092  0.214  0.090  . 0.181  0,175  0.210  0.172  0.025  0.131  0.128  0.128
Share of pensioners  4.129  0.074  0.088  0.072  4.153  0.122  0.004  0.119  4.154  0.106  0.097  0.103
Urban  Reference
Rural  0040  0.029  0.047  0.028  0.057  0.044  0.040  0.044  |  0.027  0.038  0.051  0.036
Regional dummies
Moscow and St. Petersburg  Reference
NorthernandNorthwest  4.318  0.072  4.118  0.070  -0.460  0.111  4.131  0.108  4.225  0.095  4.115  0.093
Central Black-Earth  4.171  0.060  4.096  0.059  4.153  0.092  4.009  0.091  4.195  0.080  4.164  0.078
Volga-Vaytski  and Volga  4.195  0.061  4.167  0 060  4.215  0.093  4.165  0.091  4.191  0.081  4.173  0.079
North Caucasian  0.103  0.064  0.201  0.063  0.018  0.098  0.138  0.096  0.153  0 086  0.247  0.084
Ural  4.130  0.062  0.020  0.061  4.095  0.095  0.079  0 093  4.165  0.082  -0.027  0.081
Western Sibenan  4.140  0.067  4.064  0 065  4.206  0.102  4.015  0.100  4.101  0.089  4.104  0.086
Eastern Sibena and Far East  4.019  0.066  0 055  0.064  4.039  0.099  0.103  0.098  4.007  0.088  0.013  0.086
39Auxiliary parameters
Cl  -1.290  0.126  -1.725  0.123  -1.584  0.196  -1.916  0.194  -1.249  0.172  -1.727  0.169
c2  -04732  0.125  -1.107  0.123  -1.027  0.195  -1.312  0.192  -0.688  0.172  -1.097  0.168
c3  -0.207  0.125  -0.446  0.122  -0.478  0.194  -0.616  0.192  -0.179  0.172  -0.460  0.167
c4  0.232  0.125  0.122  0.122  -0.043  0.194  -0.041  0.191  0.265  0.172  0.105  0.167
c5  0.985  0.126  1.023  0.123  0.721  0.195  0.872  0.192  1.010  0.173  1.000  0.168
c6  1.420  0.127  1.656  0.125  1.165  0.197  1.470  0.195  1.441  0.174  1.662  0.171
Aldrich-Nelson  pseudo R2 0.133  0.150  0.122  0.142  0.144  0.161
Log likelihood  -13899.144  -14056.09  -6033.2785  -6000.5899  -7847.0748  -8037.1467
N  8266  3538  4728
40Table 8: Ordered probits for power and welfare  ranks including attitudinal variables on
health and expectations
Full sample  Males  Females
Power rank  Welfare rank  Power rank  Welfare rank  Power rank  Welfare rank
Coeff.  S.Err.  Coeff.  S.Err.  Coeff.  S.Err.  Coeff.  S.Err.  Coeff.  S.Err.  Coeff.  S.Err.
Income per capita  1.342  0.259  2.462  0.251  1.182  0.409  2,325  0.398  1.405  0.338  2.570  0.327
Income per capita2  -1.097  0.317  . -1.827  0.300  -1.317  0.501  -1.885  0.478  -1.019  0.417  -1.881  0.391
Individual income  0.971  0.241  1.329  0.238  0.915  0.344  1.703  0.341  0.979  0.353  0.906  0.348
Individual income2  -0.997  0.322  -1.242  0.319  -0.929  0.441  -1.910  0.438  -0.869  0.487  -0.341  0.482
Individual  characteristics
Male  0.028  0.029  -0.039  0.028
Female  Reference
Age  -0.017  0.005  -0.032  0.005  -0.032  0.008  -0.044  0.008  -0.008  0.006  -0.025  0.006
Age2/100  0.005  0.029  0.005  0.033  0.009  0.045  0.009  0.005  0.007  0.021  0.006  0.000
Single  Reference
Married  -0.046  0.051  0.047  0.050  0.020  0.085  0.095  0.085  -0.085  0.069  -0.007  0.068
Divorced  -0.069  0.071  -0.113  0.070  0.034  0.130  -0.002  0.127  -0.114  0.087  -0.155  0.086
Widowed  -0.023  0.071  -0.065  0.070  0.093  0.149  -0.161  0.147  -0.034  0.087  -0.054  0.085
Unemployed  -0.220  0.050  -0.297  0.050  -0.181  0.070  -0.356  0.069  -0.265  0.074  -0.204  0.073
Russian  Reference
Non-Russian  0.177  0.039  0.153  0.038 I 0.279  0.060  0.225  0.059 1  0.102  0.052  0.104  0.051
Education
High School  Reference
Technical/Vocational  0.047  0.031  0.060  0.031  0.082  0.048  0.042  0.047  0.025  0.042  0.080  0.041
University  0.283  0.041  0.141  0.040  0.348  0.062  0.152  0.062  0.234  0.054  0.140  0.053
Self-evaluation of  health
Very good  Reference
Good  -0.095  0.089  0.131  0.088  -0.061  0.114  0.106  0.112  -0.129  0.144  0.155  0.146
Normal  -0.325  0.090  0.005  0.089  -0.356  0.116  -0.069  0.114  -0.307  0.144  0.061  0.146
Bad  -0.617  0.097  -0.303  0.096  -0.630  0.132  -0.348  0.130  -0.606  0.151  40.260  0.152
Verybad  -0.797  0.124  -0.742  0.121  -0.905  0.197  -0.842  0.192  -0.739  0.176  -0.670  0.175
Expectations about life
Expect to live better  0.283  0.033  0.268  0.033  |  0.211  0.049  0.208  0.049 |  0.344  0.045  0.318  0.045
Expect no change  Reference
Expect to live worse  -0.355  0.034  -0.423  0.033  - -0.316  0.053  -0.426  0.052  -0.380  0.044  -0.423  0.042
Household characteristics
Household size  0.083  0.030  0.112  0.029  0.033  0.048  0.087  0.046  0.124  0.039  0.135  0.038
Household size2  -0.004  0.003  -0.009  0.003  0.000  0.005  -0.007  0.005  -0.008  0.004  40.010  0.004
Share of children 0-6 y/o  0.087  0.143  0.191  0.141  0.018  0.229  0.043  0.228  0.121  0.190  0.269  0.186
Share ofchildren 7-14 y/o  -0.151  0.097  0.135  0.095  -0.201  0.151  0.247  0.149  -0.147  0.139  0.024  0.137
Share of women  0.026  0.102  0.146  0.100  .0.010  0.194  0.175  0.192  0.033  0.145  0.086  0.141
Share of  pensioners  -0.167  0.082  0.113  0.080  -0.298  0.135  -0.034  0.134  -0.097  0.116  0.176  0.113
Urban  Reference
Rural  0.051  0.032  0.079  0.031  0.072  0.049  0072  0.049 I  0.037  0.041  0.084  0.040
41Regional dummies
Moscow and St. Petersburg  Reference
Northem and Northwest  -0.162  0.082  -0.004  0.080  -0.305  0.128  40.076  0.125  -0.070  0.107  0.062  0.105
Central Black-Earth  -0.092  0.068  -0.044  0.067  -0.081  0.105  .0.041  0.103  -0.102  0.090  .0.035  0.089
Volga-Vaytski  and Volga  .0.094  0.069  -0.071  0.068  -0.104  0.106  -0.148  0.104  -0.093  0.091  -0.011  0.090
North Caucasian  0.097  0.073  0.245  0.072  0.023  0.112  0.115  0.110  0.143  0.096  0.347  0.095
Ural  .0.048  0.071  0.125  0.070  0.013  0.109  0.128  0.108  -0.097  0.094  0.131  0.092
Westem Siberian  -0.098  0.075  -0.039  0.073  -0.147  0.116  -0.052  0.113  -0.068  0.099  -0.023  0.097
East Siberia and Far East  0.069  0.073  0.093  0.072  0.062  0.112  0.081  0.110  0.072  0.097  0.106  0.096
Auxiliary parameters
cl  -1.167  0.166  -1.397  0.164  -1.607  0.249  -1.741  0.247  -0.944  0.238  -1.163  0.236
c2  -0.598  0.166  -0.740  0.164  -1.040  0.249  -1.087  0.246  -0.370  0.238  -0.502  0.236
c3  -0.062  0.166  -0.038  0Q163  -0.475  0.248  -0.334  0.245  0.148  0.238  0.169  0.235
c4  0.400  0.166  0.563  0.163  -0.013  0.248  0.273  0.245  0.612  0.238  0.768  0.236
c5  1.177  0.167  1.494  0.164  0.770  0.249  1.200  0.246  1.387  0.239  1.708  0.236
c6  1.628  0.168  2.144  0.166  1.220  0.250  1.825  0.248  1.843  0.240  2.385  0.239
Aldrich-Nelson pseudoR 2 0.148  0.169  0.134  0.167  0.155  0.173
Log likelihood  -11364.936  -11248.187  -4913.829  -4776.682  -6429.803  -6446.972
N  6588  2816  3772
42Figure 1:  Power and welfare  against household  income per capita
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43Figure 2:  Power and welfare against individual income
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44Figure 3: Predicted economic welfare vs predicted power perception
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